Showing posts with label chilcot enquiry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chilcot enquiry. Show all posts

Friday, 21 January 2011

Monday, 8 March 2010

Browns Lies Exposed

On Friday Brown sat infront of the Chilcot farce and said "he accepted every request for new equipment for Iraq". Money no issue the troops got what they needed.

However a top civil servant at the MOD has come out at the Chilcot enquiry and completely dismissed the PM stance.

Sir Bill Jeffrey Permanent Under Secretary at the MOD has appeared to come out alongside 2 leading military figures and again proven the PM to be a liar.




Sir Bill told the Iraq Inquiry that the small annual increases in the defence budget Mr Brown has made have not been enough to meet the sharp rises in the costs of defence operations and equipment.

That has forced the MoD to seek cuts, he said.

“The upward pressures have meant that in successive years, I and ministers, we have had to think hard about what we could cut,” he said.

Mr Brown has been under intense pressure over his record of funding the Armed Forces. Last week, he told the inquiry he had accepted every request for new equipment for Iraq and Afghanistan, and increased the total defence budget every year.

Several senior military commanders have accused Mr Brown of not telling the whole truth, pointing out that the money Mr Brown allocated to defence simply did not match the rising demands imposed by two foreign wars.

Sir Bill also said that a budget forced on the MoD by Mr Brown shortly after the Iraq war began had left the MoD with a “significant” financial problem that “persists to this day”.

There had been “a serious dispute” between Mr Brown's Treasury and the MoD in 2004 about spending, Sir Bill said. The Treasury vetoed MoD attempts to use Whitehall accounting rules to allow it to spend more on new equipment.

“That undoubtedly left the department with a significant problem because the estimated cost of the programme exceeded the budget,” he said.

Sir Bill said when he took up his post in 2005, “that pressure in the defence budget was still there.”

The defence budget has been rising in real terms by around 1 percent point a year, Sir Bill said. But that annual rise was not enough to cover the rising costs facing the MoD, he said.

“The real problem, and it persists to this day is that despite those easements, is that the defence budget has been stretched,” he said. “The cost of the programme has exceeded our ability to pay for it.”

The MoD has been forced to make “some reductions in equipment” to prioritise Afghan operations, Sir Bill said.

As an example, he cited an announcement in December that RAF fast jets will be cut to pay for more protective equipment for ground forces in Afghanistan.

“It’s been difficult against the wider financial background,” Sir Bill said.

Sir Kevin Tebbit, Sir Bill’s predecessor, told the inquiry that Mr Brown “guillotined” the defence budget and left him operating with a “crisis budget”.

Sir Bill was asked if he believes he is operating with a “crisis budget.”

He replied: “We certainly have had to look consistently at ways of reducing the estimated cost of the programme.”

“Whether that constitutes a crisis I don’t know. It has certainly felt more than quite tight over the last period.”

Source

Spot the Lying Bastard Competition




Yes I am aware others have done it before but in view of Fridays performance at the Chilcot Whitewash then the trip to Afghanistan to avoid any questions about the lies and take advantage of the troops for a photo opportunity I thought it was worth another airing !!!!!!

Lying Bastard!

Tuesday, 12 January 2010

Alastair Campbell in the witness box: this time, the truth........bwahahahahahaha



As I write this piece a certain Malcom Tucker based individual namely Tony Blair’s former press secretary, Alastair Campbell, gives evidence to the Chilcot Whitwash sorry Inquiry today.

High on the agenda, one hopes, will be his involvement in the famous September 2002 weapons of mass destruction dossier. As an aide-memoire to readers and having used info from Andrew Gilligan, I detail below the main, shall we say, inconsistencies about which Mr Campbell should (but probably won’t) be asked.

Mr Campbell’s claims:

1. In evidence (Q1092) to the Commons’ foreign affairs committee (FAC), he claimed: “The entire document was the product of the pen of the Joint Intelligence Committee chairman [John Scarlett].”

2. Campbell also claimed: “The allegation… that I, or anyone in Downing Street, exaggerated and distorted intelligence…is totally untrue.” (para 9 of his memo to the FAC.)

3. Campbell or his deputy, Godric Smith, repeatedly claimed that there had been no political interference whatever in the dossier. For instance, at the Downing Street press briefing of 4 June 2003 (on page 6 of this PDF): “The dossier was entirely the work of the intelligence agencies… Suggestions that any pressure was put on the intelligence services by No 10 or anyone else to change the document were entirely false.”

The reality:

1. The foreword of the dossier was written by Campbell, as this memo of 17 September 2002, a week before publication, makes clear. In his own evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry a few weeks ago, Scarlett himself belatedly admitted this too. The foreword was where the dossier’s most incendiary statements appeared, such as the claim that the intelligence on Saddam’s WMD was “beyond doubt.”

2. The 17 September memo also shows that Campbell suggested 15 changes to the executive summary and main body of the document to Scarlett. Most were accepted and their effect was to harden up the document’s language from possibility to probability, or probability to certainty.

3. Among the most serious: following Campbell’s suggestion in the memo, a false statement, unsupported by intelligence reporting, was inserted in the dossier that Saddam had continued to “make progress” with his illicit weapons programmes.

4. Campbell lied to the FAC about the contents of the September 17 memo, giving them only a bowdlerised version (see here, item eight) which omitted his comments on the famous “45-minute” claim and downplayed his intervention on most of the other issues.

5. Campbell, in his own words, “bombarded” Scarlett, demanding that he make Iraq’s nuclear programme look more threatening. His suggestions were largely included in the published dossier even though they were not supported by intelligence.

In the September17 memo, Campbell told Scarlett that he and Blair were “worried about the way you have expressed the nuclear issue” – namely, that it was not made to seem alarming enough. (This was in fact the truth. As Chilcot has heard, British intelligence was quite clear before the war that Iraq was many years from a nuclear weapon and in no sense a nuclear threat.)

The following day, Campbell emailed Scarlett, saying that he had showed the draft dossier “cold” to a member of his staff who had been left (correctly) thinking “there’s nothing much to worry about” over the nuclear issue. “Sorry to bombard on this point,” Campbell says, “but I do worry that the nuclear section… as currently drafted, is not in great shape.”

The day after that, Campbell emailed Scarlett again, suggesting the insertion of a totally false claim, that the “the timelines [for Iraq obtaining a nuclear weapon] are considerably shortened however if Iraq manages to obtain fissile material illegally from overseas. In these circumstances, the JIC assessed in early 2002 that they could produce nuclear weapons in between one and two years.”

After some resistance by Scarlett, this fabrication duly appeared in the dossier as: “We therefore judge that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.” (Dossier para 23, page 27.)

6. Most meetings on the dossier were attended by spin-doctors and some were actually chaired by Campbell, something which even Lord Hutton criticised.

These are far from the only interventions by Campbell - and he was, of course, far from the only Downing Street political appointee to interfere in the dossier process. Significant interventions were also made by other Downing Street and Foreign Office spin-doctors and by the Prime Minister’s chief of staff, Jonathan Powell. Powell is up next Monday – we might have a look at some of his handiwork then.

Campbell will not be troubled by the inquiry board. He is an accomplished liar and far to intelligent to be outsmarted by that group.
He does not care about the fact both the evidence and the bulk of the public know the doc was sexed up.

However the question is how does he sit knowing that he has blood on his hands. Not just the deaths of British Servicemen and women so that Blair could play patsy to Bush but the fact that a certain Dr David Kelly also paid with his life......See here.




UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE............Gordon Brown was involved in decision-making says Alastair Campbell................Oh bugger me its gonna get even more messy now.....spin machines gone up a gear!!!!!

Wednesday, 9 December 2009

"You see I ad this gezzer in me motor and he's only gone an said"


Yesterday at the Chilcot Enquiry we were given the testimony of the former Chair of the JIC, John Scarlett.

For intelligence studies scholars, this is a good moment.

In recent times we have had the Scott Report (1996), Butler (2004) and now this inquiry, which whilst not focussed solely on intelligence will mention it a lot. And even from one days testimony, we can draw some interesting lessons, some of which are now well rehearsed.

1) We went to war despite the evidence(?)

In the absence of a formal transcript from the Inquiry (it was only yesterday) cites have to come from the time-stamps of when evidence was given. At 1502 Scarlett said that intelligence was received stating that Iraq had begun dismantling some of its WMD. He said this wasn’t a ‘game-changing’ moment as it was assumed that this was part of a concealment programme.

We might all note a classic ‘group-think’ and ‘mirroring’ moment here. ‘If I was in Saddam’s shoes, I would do x and y’.

2) That the intelligence cycle was coloured by ‘boss think’(?)

This refers to the practice of finding evidence to fit the hypothesis of a strong voice in the room. It has often been referred to in this context – a decision taken by a small group, in which there is a strong voice. But we might equally apply it to a cascade of the sort of sofa-government that Blair was so fond. If Blair had signed up to the war in March 2002 (as per the testimony of Christopher Meyer two weeks ago) then it stands to reason, in the sofa-government model, that the chair of the JIC would come under indirect pressure (consciously or unconsciously) to be ‘on message’, although at 1625 he denied that he had come under pressure to ‘firm-up’ the dossier. I’m personally not sure it would be possible to be immune from the clearly stated desire of the Prime Minister to steer this course, particularly not in the small and necessarily closed community that formed the Core Executive in the run up to war. This sort of oblique pressure would also be likely to cascade down to the Assessments Staff and interested parties. This sort of cascade and social phenomenon would help to account for the 1502 statement above, and allegations made by the MP Adam Holloway that the so-called 45 minute claim came from an Iraqi taxi driver, and that some MI6 reservations about the intelligence had been ignored.

3) It’s the end-use of intelligence product that’s the problem(?)

The evidence given yesterday seemed to criticise Tony Blair for having given too much emphasis to the notion that the intelligence on WMD was ‘beyond doubt’ and whilst Scarlett said there had been ‘no intention to manipulate the language’ on the so-called 45minute claim (1529), it is clear that it was false and was retracted after the commencement of military actions in March 2003.

I have often thought that intelligence failure is rarely the fault of, or has been rarely caused by intelligence officers – more often than not it has been a wilful or accidental failure of communication between intelligence agencies and their political masters. In this case it seems to have been a fantastic case of boss-think and group-think. And as Chilcot said: “There is a sentence which echoes for me in the prime minister’s foreword: “What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt.” I just wonder, recalling that chapter one of the Butler report, whether it is ever possible to say “assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt”.

And that is the nub of all of this. Intelligence product is not fact. Not even when it is rigorously produced. It is a best guess, and a good hypothesis. And what’s more, intelligence and the policies that it informs (or reinforces) are better considered as part of a power-equation than a scientific process. From this limited snap-shot it appears that there were some crucial errors in thinking, and some wilful movements in certain directions – but it would be an error to lay the blame at the door of our intelligence agencies; they didn’t make the decision to go to war, nor did they play – it seems – a big part in it. They were used – rather instrumentally – to convince us of the need for war, and in that it is not just ministers that need to be educated in the use of intelligence, but us too.

Blair woke up this morning and I dont think he had the best nights sleep he has ever had.

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